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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. 
ROBERT KELTON BERRY, : Case No. 20040142-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
POINT I. THE SECOND ELEMENT OF THE ROBERTSON TEST 
SURVIVED THE UTAH SUPREME COURTS REASONABLE DOUBT LINE 
OF CASES. 
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
overrule the second element of the Robertson test that states a reasonable doubt definition 
"should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which 'would govern or control a person 
in the more weighty affairs of life/ as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision 
of whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (quoting State v. Ireland, 773 
P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent)). The continued validity of the second element 
of the Robertson test is evident from the third of the Utah Supreme Court's reasonable 
doubt cases, State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49. In Weaver, the Court clarified that Reyes 
"overruled the Robertson test mandating that a reasonable doubt instruction specifically 
require the state to 'obviate all reasonable doubt.'" Weaver, 2005 UT 49 at ^ 7 (quoting 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, p o , 116 P.3d 305. The Supreme Court overruled this element 
because "it tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect 
violates the Victor standard." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 1J27. Unlike the first element of the 
Robertson test, the second element remains valid after Reyes because it, as required by 
the Victor test, ensures the reasonable doubt definition given to the jury does not "tend[] 
to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict" the defendant. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 
at 127. 
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court said the 
"government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense." 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citation omitted). "The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process." Id A definition of reasonable doubt 
violates the due process clause if, '"taken as a whole,'" "there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury understood the [definition of reasonable doubt] to allow conviction based on 
proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6 (citation omitted). For 
example, in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), the trial court defined 
reasonable doubt as "a grave uncertainty" or "an actual substantial doubt" that prevents 
the jury from reaching a "moral certainty." Cage, 498 U.S. at 40. The Supreme Court 
held the instruction was unconstitutional because "a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below 
that required by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 41. 
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, Justice Stewart's Ireland dissent, which 
ultimately produced the Robertson test, discussed how comparing the reasonable doubt 
standard to major life decisions "tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally 
required burden-of-proof standard." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381; Appellant Supp. Brief 8-
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9. These same concerns were expressed by Justice Ginsburg in urging the adoption of the 
Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Instruction for reasonable doubt. See Victor, 
511 U.S. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Appellant Supp. Brief 9-10. 
In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), the Supreme Court briefly 
addressed a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt "as 'the kind of doubt. . . 
which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be 
willing to act upon.'" Id at 140. The Court held there was no prejudicial error because, 
"taken as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to 
the jury." Id It noted, however, that: 
We think this section of the charge should have been in terms of the kind of 
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act, rather than the kind on 
which he would be willing to act. But we believe that the instruction as 
given was not the type that could mislead the jury into finding no 
reasonable doubt when in fact there was some. A definition of a doubt as 
something the jury would act upon would seem to create confusion rather 
than misapprehension. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). Several jurisdictions have interpreted Holland to draw a 
distinction between "hesitate to act" and "willingness to act" and to uphold use of the 
"hesitate to act" language. See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 694 (5th Cir. 
1978); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 
1055 (2000). This interpretation, however, is unlikely: 
The Court's problem seems to have been not with the willingness to act 
phrasing itself, but instead with the definition of doubt as something people 
would act upon. The instruction should have either defined proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as the kind of certainty people would act upon or, as the 
Court suggested, defined reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that would 
undermine a person's willingness to act. 
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That the Court was concerned with the instruction's nonsensical phrasing 
rather than the quantum of doubt described thereby is suggested by its 
observation that "[a] definition of doubt as something the jury would act 
upon would seem to create confusion rather than misapprehension." 
Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) 
(emphases in original), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998); see Victor, 511 U.S. at 24-25 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (criticizing "hesitate to act" language without referencing 
Holland); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 n.5 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting "[s]ome 
courts appear to have misunderstood" Holland, where the instruction at issue was 
"manifestly wrong as it turn[ed] the reasonable doubt standard on its head"). 
In this case, the distinction between "willingness to act" and "hesitate to act" is 
immaterial because defense counsel used the "willingness to act" language when 
comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions. R. 267:294 (defense counsel 
defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the following way "And I have talked about 
how serious these offenses are, and how important, if not more important, than deciding 
who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a house. That's how careful you 
have to be and what factors you would weigh in saying, 'Am I going to marry this 
person?'") R. 267:294. 
Other jurisdictions agree "there is a substantial difference between a juror's 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of 
personal importance to him." Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 
1965), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 883 (1967); see, e.g., United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 
20 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that "comparing the reasonable doubt standard with the process 
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employed by a juror in making important decisions in his or her own life" has potential 
"for impermissibly reducing the government's burden of proof'); United States v. 
Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding "most important decisions 
in life—choosing a spouse, buying a house, borrowing money, and the like—may involve 
a heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking and are wholly unlike the decisions jurors 
ought to make in criminal cases"); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d 201, 
204-09 & n.l (Mass. 1984) (finding error based on instruction including comparisons to 
decisions regarding professions, marriage, home, and surgery); Commonwealth v. 
Ferreira, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Mass. 1977) (holding "degree of certainty required to 
convict is unique to the criminal law" and people do not "customarily make private 
decisions according to this standard"). 
As argued in Appellant's Supplemental Brief, Robertson's prohibition against 
defining reasonable doubt by analogizing it to major life decisions remains good law. 
See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. Therefore, by violating this prohibition, defense 
counsel's performance fell "below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v. 
Montova, 2004 UT 5, ^[23, 84 P.3d 1183. Given the well-established case law that the 
use of these types of analogies tends to diminish the standard of proof necessary to 
convict, defense counsel's comparisons cannot be considered sound trial strategy and 
prejudiced Mr. Berry because there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome 
had defense counsel not lowered the State's burden of proof by misstating the reasonable 
doubt standard. Thus, defense counsel's performance meets the Strickland test. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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POINT II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE COACHING OF THE 
PROSECUTION'S ONLY WITNESS TO THE EVENTS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM 
THE JURYS CONSIDERATION OF CREDIBILITY. 
"[A] number of state courts have held that coaching is a matter which bears upon a 
witness' credibility[.]" State v. Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb. 1993). Therefore, 
"the question of coaching is one for the jury." Id. Utah has also determined that "[i]t is 
for the factfinder to determine witness credibility." State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 
1096 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993); see 
also Gillespie v. Southern Utah State College, 669 P.2d 861 (1983) ("It is the exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses . . . ."). Indeed, recently 
in Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, where transcript evidence of coaching of one of the 
state's witnesses had not been disclosed to defendant, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that had the transcripts been disclosed the defendant may have been able to 
use them to "raise[] questions in the minds of the jurors as to the overall veracity or 
credibility of [the witness'] account." Id. at ^|67. Therefore, the trial court's error in 
excluding the coaching of the state's key witness from the jury consideration of 
credibility was prejudicial. 
When the trial court instructed the jury that they could not consider the coaching 
of the state's key witness, it "usurp[ed] the fact-finding function of [the] . . . jury." 
Stafaniak, 900 P.2d at 1096) (citation omitted). In giving the jury a curative instruction, 
"our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, 
including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." State v. Harmon, 956 
P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in original). Hence, it must be presumed that the 
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jury followed the trial court's instruction limiting their ability to determine the effect 
Brandon's mother's coaching had on Brandon's credibility. 
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the judge's error was prejudicial because 
Brandon's credibility, perceptions, and memory provided the only evidence supporting 
guilt. Appellant's Opening Brief 50. This was a close case where Brandon's testimony 
was inconsistent regarding many aspects of what took place making Mr. Berry's 
involvement in the offense suspect. Appellant's Opening Brief 34-40; Appellant Supp. 
Brief 11-14. Given that Brandon's testimony was the only evidence supporting Mr. 
Berry's guilt, the trial court's erroneous jury instruction usurping the jury's ability to 
consider the coaching of his testimony was "sufficiently prejudicial that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence." Seel v. 
Van Per Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth more fully in the opening and supplemental brief, Appellant, Robert 
Kelton Berry, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this __3_ day of November, 2005. 
y&4/* *-
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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